UTU Local 426   Spokane, WA

UTU Local 426 Archived News.

07/29/06

Train derails north of Klamath Falls
PORTLAND, Ore. -- A freight train hauling lumber derailed north of Klamath Falls Thursday, blocking a main line and delaying rail traffic, authorities said.

There were no injuries or hazardous spills, and crews were assessing how to get the 38 derailed cars back on track, said James Barnes, a Union Pacific spokesman.

The 105-car train was taking lumber from Roseville, Calif., to a town 40 miles north of Klamath Falls, Barnes said. The cause of the derailment has not been determined.

An Amtrak passenger used her cell phone to call the (Klamath Falls) Herald and News at 9:45 p.m. Jeanine Day, the newspaper's business manager, said the Coast Starlight 14 passenger train -- headed north from just outside Paso Robles, Calif. -- was terminating service.

"They told us it was because of the derailment and they're pulling us backwards to Paso Robles," Day told the paper.

She said Amtrak officials said they would bus anyone destined for points as far north as Redding, Calif., and would return others to their points of origin.

The derailed cars tumbled next to North Highway 97. Klamath County Sheriff's deputies and Oregon State Police were on the scene late Thursday making sure workers were safe from the traffic, the Herald and News reported.

(The preceding Associated Press article was published July 28, 2006, by The Mercury News.)

07/16/06

FRA slaps BNSF on PTC safety
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has slammed the credibility of BNSF Railway's positive train control pilot projects, citing inconsistencies in BNSF's safety plan.

 

The agency also complained that descriptive language explaining the railroad's compliance with FRA safety requirements was written in broad generalities that disguise numerous defects.

 

BNSF's Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) is one of the rudimentary positive train control technologies being tested under special FRA waivers from certain safety regulations.

 

The UTU supports development of PTC systems, but only if they meet adequate federal safety requirements.

 

"These various experimental PTC systems are still in their infancy," said UTU International President Paul Thompson. "The FRA clearly is not satisfied with BNSF's safety plan for its ETMS, which reflects the carrier's reckless disregard for public safety."

 

BLET National President Don Hahs said, "PTC must be much more than hype. It must be rigorously analyzed and tested, and we applaud the FRA for requiring strict compliance with applicable regulations."

 

Indeed, in a highly critical June 29 letter to the carrier (released July 10), the FRA said it no longer trusts the basic safety assumptions of BNSF's positive train control pilot projects. BNSF has been experimenting with ETMS on a little 115-mile subdivision in Illinois and is seeking permission from FRA to expand testing to line segments in Texas and Oklahoma, including routes used by Amtrak
"These pilot projects have been used by BNSF as baubles to entice investors, the media and lawmakers to believe BNSF was advancing rapidly toward introduction of positive train control technology intended to replace experienced crew members," said UTU Alternate National Legislative Director James Stem. "The FRA exposed BNSF's smoke and mirrors approach and validated that BNSF and other railroads are years away, at best, from perfecting PTC to where it might be implemented safely."
In February, BNSF sought -- and failed to gain -- FRA approval to operate the experimental ETMS technology with only a single crew person. The UTU, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen opposed that BNSF request, telling the FRA that no trains should be permitted to operate with single-person crews until appropriate safety studies have been completed and regulations in place.
"The multiple safety functions of the second operating crew member are not replaced by ETMS," Stem said. "The second crew member provides an important second set of eyes and ears, as validated by the FRA's Collision Analysis Working Group, which is on record that 'for freight trains, the conductor and engineer work as a team. One member points out situations that may have escaped the other's attention.'"

 

BLET's director of regulatory affairs, Thomas Pontolillo, told the FRA that "the most effective positive train control is one that complements and supplements the work of today's two- or three-person train crew, and that PTC, as a means of further reducing crew size, will diminish -- rather than enhance -- safety."

 

BNSF is also having a major system-wide problem with the accuracy of train consists. These lists show the number of freight cars in a train, the length of each car, the contents of the car, the destination and the number of axles contained on the car. Such consists, required by federal regulations to be accurate, are used by operating crews and emergency responders to determine the exact location of hazmat. The FRA demanded BNSF solve the problem of its inaccurate consists.

 

BNSF had removed from trackside defect detectors the voice message, which gives operating crews a total axle count of each train. Instead of working to resolve this major safety issue, BNSF arrogantly removed the only source of information used by their crews to verify the accuracy of train consists.

 

With regard to ETMS, the FRA harshly criticized changes made by BNSF in its risk-assessment methodology. FRA Deputy Associate Administrator Grady Cothen, speaking for FRA's safety board, said, "Upon being briefed on the status of the risk assessment, I became alarmed that it appears to rely heavily on the notion that risks that might be generated by the system would effectively never be realized because reliance by the locomotive engineer is forbidden."

 

"ETMS only encourages engineer reliance on a system that doesn't work as promised and does nothing to address the major problems of employee fatigue, lack of experience, and inadequate training," Stem said.

 

"Additionally, BNSF failed to include available technology systemwide to indicate to train crews the position of switches, which would prevent horrendous accidents such as one involving a deadly chlorine tank-car leak in Graniteville, S.C.," Stem said. "It is unconscionable that railroads, enjoying their highest profits in modern history, would continue to refuse to invest in switch monitors in dark territory."

 

To read the June 29 FRA letter to BNSF, click on this link: http://dmsesdot.gov/docimages/pdf97/404787_web.pdf  (a high-speed connection is suggested; dial-up connections may not permit downloading because of the document's length.)
 

07/15/06

New document added to the Links Doc's and Forms page. or click this link. Agreement Rules

07/09/06

NTSB Wants Rules to Ease Fatigue in Railroad Workers

Union Pacific Corp. and other U.S. railroads should be required to take steps to reduce worker fatigue after a fatal 2004 accident in Texas in which the engineer probably was asleep, a federal board said.

The National Transportation Safety Board urged rail regulators Thursday to develop science-based rules to prevent irregular schedules that reduce alertness and to limit duty time after 12 hours. The board found that a Union Pacific crew caused the June 28, 2004, crash by passing a stop signal, hitting a BNSF Railway Company train and releasing chlorine gas.

The train was bound for Tucson when it hit the BNSF train, which was headed for Tulsa, Oklahoma, and was moving to a side track about 15 miles from San Antonio, Texas.

Union Pacific employs about 900 workers in Southern Arizona.

Three people died after inhaling the gas from a tank car punctured in the collision. The accident happened about two hours after the crew reported for duty. The engineer worked 37 of the 55 hours before his shift and still was within federal rules limiting duty time, NTSB investigator Gerald Weeks said.

"It seems amazing to me that we are in this point in time and we don't have better management of employee schedules," board member Deborah Hersman said at the Washington hearing. "The crew is being asked to get more rest when they are off duty, but they have no control over when they are called for duty."

The board's recommendations to the Transportation Department's Federal Railroad Administration aren't binding. The rail agency sets and enforces industry safety rules, including duty limits that require eight hours of rest after as many as 12 hours of work, and 10 hours off if duty time exceeds 12 hours. The railroad administration will give railroads a technical report on fatigue as early as August that will include methods to calculate tiredness that draw on studies by the Defense Department and others, agency spokesman Steve Kulm said.

The Union Pacific crew in the Texas accident worked irregular schedules and watched movies or played cards instead of getting enough rest before going on duty, Weeks said. The NTSB didn't identify the crew members.

The conductor failed to alert the engineer when the train passed a warning signal at 45 miles per hour instead of 30 mph or tell him to stop at a red signal, and the engineer didn't slow down, Weeks said.

The engineer told investigators he didn't remember anything about the trip. The conductor's blood-alcohol level exceeded federal limits when he reported for work, Robert Chipkevich, director of the safety board's railroad office, said. All railroads forbid alcohol consumption on duty. The companies don't have rules that limit drinking before work.

"While we agree generally that the accident was caused by human factors, we cannot comment fully on the board's investigation until we review the actual findings and conclusions in detail," said Union Pacific spokesman James Barnes. The company is the biggest U.S. railroad by sales.

The board also recommended that workers receive training in finding more time to sleep when they are off duty and that railroads be required to install crash-prevention technology.

Technology called "positive train control" would have prevented the collision, said Mark Rosenker, the board's acting chairman. The satellite-based technology lets a dispatcher halt a train if it passes a stop signal.

BNSF is using such a system on a 124-mile line in Southern Illinois. Union Pacific, Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration also are testing the technology in Illinois for use on trains between Chicago and St. Louis.

The safety board again recommended putting tank cars toward the rear of trains to reduce the risk of puncture in a collision. The chlorine car in the Union Pacific accident was 12 cars back from the engines and had 62 loads behind it. - Ripley Watson, Bloomberg News, The Tucson Arizona Daily Star

07/05/06

Dear Sisters and Brothers:

The provisions of the current National Wage Agreement provide a $0.01 per hour COLA increase to be effective July 1, 2006.

Consistent with action taken by the Board of Directors to apply the COLA increases to regular and part time salary rates, the rates in effect June 30, 2006 will automatically increase by the greater of $0.01 per hour or 0.05%, providing authorization is included in Bylaws or other acceptable actions taken by General Committees of Adjustment and/or Legislative Boards, with the further provision that such increases would not be detrimental to solvency of the Advance Funds, or conflict with restrictive measures of record necessarily imposed through directives from either of our offices. There will be no increase in the employee monthly contribution toward the cost of health care on July 1, 2006.

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2006

The UTU’s maximum part time daily rate under the current agreement will be $209.07. The mileage rate will remain at 44.5 cents per mile and per diem remains $113.00.

If less than maximum daily part-time salary rates are involved, proportional adjustments will be made as duly authorized. Committees having self-established sub-maximum salary rates not tied to the National Wage Agreement will not be affected.

Fraternally yours,
/s/Dan E. Johnson
General Secretary & Treasurer
 

Read the original letter here.

07/01/06

Pasco Pool Proposed Agreement

Read the new agreement proposal here and post your views and comments on the open forum.

                Recent TWC Failures due to missing info

  •  No Date

  •  No Subdivision

  •  Did not enter which box’s were x’ed

  •  No Name of person copying TW

  •  No time TW was cleared

  •  No name of person releasing TW

  •  Track Warrants appear to be prewritten prior to receiving info from DS over radio. Big NO NO

  •  Voided TW’s did not have VOID written across them

  •  TW’s were not turned in at the end of the trip.

         The FRA is taking a hard nose stand on TWC territories, you need to understand that being qualified on GCOR subjects you to not only knowing the how to properly work in TWC but also subjects you  to Operations Test failures that could result in discipline, as well as individual fines from the FRA for willfully violating these rules which cannot be covered by the BNSF. 

COMPLYING WITH EMERGENCY ORDER #24 IN DARK TERRITORY

 When rolling up track, first document on switch form that all switches and derails lined in normal position for mainline movement. Then you must state to the dispatcher, after clearing the limits of the warrant, “All derails and mainline switches lined in normal position for mainline movement, all information documented on proper form, and crew briefing has taken place.” The dispatcher will then repeat. The engineer will then respond, “Engineer Smith confirms information.” This same process when clearing a warrant, be sure to include who cleared it and time it was cleared.

At each location where main line switches are operated for switching moves, when restored, above information needs to be spoken and concurred by all crew members in person or over radio. It must then be documented on proper form when switches opened and when restored.        

At the completion of the shift, the switch form, delay report, and all warrants that you void need to be turned in together separate from a signed copy of your timeslip.